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PURCHASE FOR VALUE WITHOUT NOTICE
Although conscious of repeating what has been said better else-
-where, I would like to say a few words upon an article in the
YALE LAW JOURNAL for January by Professor Kenneson. 1 In
this the learned writer, in the form of a criticism of the well
known views of Dean Ames, presents an exposition of the rights
of the assignee of a chose in action and the transferee from a
cestui que trust where there has been a prior equity created by the
assignor. The case stated is this: T, the owner of a chose in
action, makes himself trustee of it for the benefit of C; then
assigns it to A, who learns of the rights of C before collection is
made. Professor Kenneson holds that C should be preferred to
A, basing his contention upon two main points.
First, he says that the assignee of a chose in action, because
his right may be defeated by the debtor's making payment either
to the original creditor or another assignee, has only an equitable
right.2 As to this, it niay be suggested that a legal right is. one
which will be enforced in a court of law and certainly the as-
signee has this sort of a right. But further, the fact that it may
be cut off or destroyed by the action of another does not indicate
that there is only an equitable right here. The same is true of
many legal rights. Thus the owner of property may have his
legal title destroyed by its sale in market overt, if that now any-
where exists, or by an agent who has been authorized by him to
do so. If one buys personal property and suffers it to remain in
the hands of the seller, it is possible for the latter to defeat his
title in many cases by sale to a third person, and the same is true
of course where the buyer of real estate fails to record the con-
veyance. In all of these cases the title is in one person while a
power to affect that title resides in another, though the exercise
of that power may be wrongful. The legal owner in these cases
may have redress in equity to prevent the destruction of his
right, but that would not justify us in saying that his rights are
only equitable. So in the case of an assignment of a chose in
action, the power which the assignor or a subsequent assignee
has to defeat the rights of the assignee whose rights are in ques-
tion does not indicate in any way that his rights are only equit-
'23 Yale Law Journal, p. 193.
2 Page 212.
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able. Is it true that only equitable rights can be wrongfully de-
stroyed? There is some room in a court of law for a bona fide
purchaser.
Professor Kenneson's co-ordinate point is that upon collection
of the debt by the assignee, the title to the chose in possession
which is received in payment of the debt passes through the as-
signor; that the assignee being only an agent, would have lio
more right to transfer the title to himself with knowledge of the
rights of the cestui, than the assignor would have the right to
transfer the title to any subsequent equitable encumbrancer.3 The
fallacy here lies in considering the assignee an agent, though it is
true that the courts have invoked the fiction of agency to make a
chose in action assignable. But an agent is a fiduciary; he is
bound by the will and is under the control of the principal; he
acts for the benefit of the latter. An assignee is not a fiduciary,
his power is irrevocable and he acts for his own benefit.4 Even
in states where he is not -allowed to sue in his own name, he is
in complete control of any action he may have to bring for col-
lection. 5 There is never any occasion for him to go into equity
save where his legal right is threatened with destruction, and then
his right is equitable only to the same extent as is the right of any
legal owner of property. He is in law the dominus of the chose,
having the legal power of control. Though acting in the name ot
the assignor, he is not at any step the latter's agent. If, now, he
collects the money, assuming that the title to it must first pass
through the assignor, something which is at least doubtful, is
there anything wrongful in his exercise of the power to transfer
title to himself? He owes no obligation to the assignor; the
latter is not even vicariously committing a breach of trust, for he
surrendered control over the chose when he made the assign-
ment. In fact the only method by which the cestui could prevent
the collection of the debt would be by an appeal to a court of
equity, since the cestui has no standing in a court of law. The
question is, therefore, whether equity should interfere with the
3 Page 196.
4 Knapp v. Alvord, 10 Paige, 205; Dazey v. Mills, 10 Ill., 67.
5 King v. Miller, 53 Or., 542; Anderson v. Miller, 15 Miss., 586; Welch
v. Mandevile, 11 U. S., 152; 1 Wheat., 233.
O In the niandatum in rem suan of the Roman law, even before itb
development by the praetor, the assignee came to be considered a true
successor.
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exercise of a legal right which has been paid for in ignorance of
the existence of an equitable claim. Admitting that equity will
not help one to perfect a title where there is a prior existing
equitable right, should it interfere to take from a bona fide pur-
chaser of a legal right that which he has ? Using the language of
the courts, there is not here that equality without which the
maxim that the prior equity prevails has no application.
In regard to Dodds v. Hills," which Professor Kenneson thinks
to have been misinterpreted by Dean Ames, it is suggested that
the latter may have been guilty of using colloquial language but
that his result is sound. In that case, a trustee, in breach of trust,
delivered to one Smith, a "bona fide purchaser", certificates of
stock, Smith to have the usual right to be substituted as a share-
holder upon surrender of the certificates to the -company. Upon
June 14, Smith learned of the existing equity; upon June 19, he
surrendered the certificates to the company, and the court held
that he was entitled to retain his rights as shareholder. Of
course, as Professor Kenneson points out, the signing of the
transfer book is a needless formality, but it is not true, as he sug-
gests, that upon the delivery of the stock certificates by the trus-
tee to the transferee, the latter became a shareholder. Until he
was registered and recognized by the company, he had merely a
right to become a shareholder,9 i. e., a power to compel a nova-
tion, a power, by the way, which could have been enforced speci-
fically only in a court of equity. Is it not fair to argue, then, that
if the assignee of a share of stock would cut out prior equities,
though he acquires knowledge of them before he becomes a share-
holder, a fortiori, th- assignee of an ordinary debt claim should have
the right to appropriate the proceeds of its payment. Although in
a novation there is no chance for the title to vest in the assignor,
if the contention previously made is sound, that the holder of the
power to collect is not an agent, the result would be the same.
Finally, as Professor Kenneson points out, the rule should be
the same in all cases of choses in action, whether legal or equit-
7 For instance in a bill for discovery, it was a good defence that the
defendant was a bona fide purchaser. See Pomeroy's Equity Jurispru-
dence, §200 and cases cited.
82 H. & M., 424.
9 This would seem to be correct on principle and is the rule in England
where Dodds v. Hills was decided. Lindley, Corporations, 6th ed., §656;
Machen, Law of Corporations, §852.
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able, and, if we adopt the in personam theory, this leads inevit-
ably to the conclusion that a purchaser from a cestui que trust
should hold free from the equities of a sub-trustee. The opposite
result which is reached in the English cases (and it -must be ad-
mitted that the language in Phillips v. Phillips ° supports this
view) can be upheld only upon the ground that the rights of a
cestui are not wholly defined by the mere procedure adopted by
the courts of equity, but that he has in fact a right in rein.
W. A. Searey.
Norman, Oklahoma.
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